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Abstract 
The financing of agricultural producers is one of the most acute problems along the 
entire scope of economic reforms in Kazakhstan. The issue is: What kind of financial 
sources could maintain the development of agricultural production?  
 
Internal sources such as profit, depreciation capital, and various reserve and insurance 
funds can not be considered as a key financial base. State financial support of 
agriculture in Kazakhstan (which plays a significant role in the most developed 
countries), is episodic in nature, small in size and typically does not reach the 
recipients. In these circumstances, a potential supplier of financial and investment 
resources could be a banking system and such non-banking credit institutions as credit 
cooperatives.  
 
Econometric analysis is used to analyze the determinants of credit access. Results 
suggest that access to subsidized credit has a significant role in determining access to 
bank credits and investment activity of agricultural enterprises. Major determinants of 
credit rationing are the size of arable land possessed by the agricultural enterprise and 
the cost of equipment, expressing an ability of borrower to use them as collateral.  
 
Keywords and JEL codes: agricultural finance, credit rationing, micro-econometrics 
analysis.  G21, O16, Q 14. 
 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Rural financial market development is of high importance for Kazakhstan, as the country 
has about 44% of its population living in rural areas and about 24% of the total population 
is engaged in agricultural production. There are three main sources of formal credit in the 
agricultural sector of Kazakhstan: commercial banks, rural credit partnerships (RCP), and 
micro-credit organisations (MCO). However, their shares in the total loans for agriculture 
are far from parity.  Commercial banks have the major share of all loans for agriculture, 
more than 90%, the RCPs’ share is declining and accounting for about 5%; the MCOs take 
less than 1% of the total loans (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Shares of loans to agriculture in Kazakhstan  
   2005 2006 2007 
Total (million KZT)  198728.3 254677.5  298172.3
Share of credit (in %):    
Commercial banks   90.2 95.5  94.5
Rural Credit Partnerships (RCPs)  9.3 3.8  5.1
Micro Credit Organisations (MCO)  0.5 0.7  0.4
Notes:     KZT – Kazakh Tenge (Kazakhstani currency) 
Source:   Ministry of agriculture of Republic of Kazakhstan, http://www.minagri.kz 
 
Despite commercial banks having such a big share of the loans for agriculture, there is no 
well-developed rural banking system currently existing in the country. Moreover, only two 
commercial banks of thirty have limited networks of branches in rural areas. In 
comparison with urban areas, rural clientele in Kazakhstan are more dispersed, with a low 
average population density of six individuals per square kilometre. According to the 
statistical data, all banks grant loans to agricultural producers; however, the share of 
agricultural banking in the total bank loan portfolio is quite insignificant. Additionally, 
commercial banks prefer to provide loans to large-scale agricultural enterprises; in 2007, 
the latter obtained as much as 95.5% of total credit to agriculture whereas the share of 
loans to private family farms has been continually decreasing. Banks generally consider 
lending to small rural households and private family farms as having an unacceptably low 
return rate, a high risk, a small size of demanded loan, and high transaction costs (Table 
2). 
 
Table 2: Loans provided by commercial banks to agriculture in Kazakhstan 
  2005 2006 2007 
Loan volume (billion KZT)  189.5  243.2  282.0
Share of agricultural lending in total loan portfolio (in %)  6.3  4.6  3.5
Share of agricultural enterprises in loans granted to agriculture (in 
%) 
96.3 96.0 96.5
Nominal interest rate (in %)  14  13.6  15
Source:  National Bank of Kazakhstan, http://www.nationalbank.kz 
 
 Even large-scale grain producers routinely experience credit difficulties, self-finance 
remains the main investment source in agricultural production in Kazakhstan (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Structure of investments in agriculture in 2006 
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Source:  Agency of statistics of Kazakhstan, www.stat.kz  
 
Thus, access to bank credit could be considered as a key factor influencing economic 
growth in rural areas of Kazakhstan. However, a source of financing such as RCP could 
considered as having good prospects in the near future. A rural credit partnership system is 
a new form for Kazakhstani agriculture. The history of its development is only 7 years, 
including 2 years in the pilot project period. According to the project idea, RCPs had to 
become prototypes of rural credit cooperatives. However, it is still too early to make a 
strong analogy between RCPs and rural credit cooperatives of their classical form. 
According to a regulating law on Rural Credit Partnerships, the latter are not allowed to 
take deposits; they are partly state-owned organisations (although private ones are 
permitted, none exists) and all credits come from the state budget. Membership in the RCP 
is very restricted and depends heavily on the production type and size of land plot. 
 
As for MCO, taking into account the fact that large-scale enterprises take a major part in 
the grain production of Kazakhstan, the role of micro-crediting is insignificant.  
 
In this study two sources of agricultural financing (commercial banks and rural credit 
partnerships) and one type of agricultural producers (agricultural enterprises) are 
discussed. 
 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF CREDIT RATIONING 
 
According to Petrick (2003), credit rationing could be understood as a situation when a 
lack of sufficient credit reduces desirable investments. It means that a potential borrower 
(in our study this is an agricultural enterprise) could be considered as being credit rationed 
if its demand for credit is not met at all or is only met partly, even if the borrower is ready 
to pay a higher interest rate. In other words, credit rationing arises when lenders are not 
willing to offer as much credit as demanded by borrowers.   
 
 Credit rationing becomes the main reason for too little or underinvestment in agriculture. 
Thus, agricultural producers are not able to provide an optimal distribution of resources in 
the short-term (profit - liquidity effect), resulting in a decline of long-term investments 
into land and equipment (investment demand effect) (LERMAN and SUBBOTIN 2004). 
 
The analysis of credit rationing is focused on a main question: Is the borrower really credit 
rationed? In other words, there are difficulties to obtain formal credit, even though the 
borrower is willing and able to pay the required interest rate to a bank. If one can 
positively answer the question, then it would be reasonable to know what factors mainly 
influence access to the bank credit. That is, a lack of credit does not necessarily mean that 
there is a problem of access to credit. 
 
One can distinguish price rationing and non-price rationing. According to Boucher and 
Carter, 2002, the former is connected to the profitability of a borrower; in other words, 
related to the ability of a borrower to pay a required interest rate for the credit. In turn, 
non-price rationing is connected to such aspects as a maturity of the loan, collateral 
required, length and value of the “customer relationship”, an amount of compensating 
balance, and a risk of partial and complete default on the loan (JAFFEE 1968). 
 
In the model a probability to have formal credit was used as a dependent variable, 
regardless how much the borrower should and ready to pay.  
 
3 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF ACCESS TO THE FORMAL CREDIT 
MARKET BY AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES  
 
The analysis presented here is based on a static model that uses cross-sectional data from a 
specific production period (the year 2006). Data on agricultural enterprises was obtained 
from the Regional Agency of Statistics (Pavlodar Region, Kazakhstan), which records 
data, submitted annually (sometimes quarterly) to local statistical offices, on all medium 
and large-scale agricultural enterprises. Data on agricultural land was obtained from the 
Regional Land Committee (Pavlodar Region, Kazakhstan), which has records of the 
amount of arable or pasture land (measured in hectares: ha) rented or owned by 
agricultural enterprises.  
 
The study focuses on middle and large-scale agricultural enterprises, the successors of 
kolkhozes (collective farms) and sovkhozes (state farms). Only grain producing 
agricultural enterprises with more than 40 ha of arable land were taken into consideration. 
The reason for this selection was that, in the rural credit market, commercial banks 
provide about 90% of all credit and give the overwhelming majority of this credit to large-
scale enterprises. In the Pavlodar region large-scale enterprises mostly specialize in grain 
production. State agricultural enterprises and enterprises that produce livestock were 
excluded from the sample. 
 
Of a total of 157 registered agricultural enterprises only 93 enterprises had submitted 
reports to the Agency of Statistics in 2006.  The final study sample of enterprises covered 
81% of the total number of agricultural enterprises reporting to the Agency of Statistics 
 while employing 91% of the population employed in agricultural enterprises and covering 
75.5% of the agricultural land in the region.  The following variables were defined: labour, 
which was a measure of the number of people employed by the enterprises and land which 
was measured in terms of value which also took into account quality and marketability. 
The output of an agricultural enterprise was measured as the gross production in metric 
centner. It should be noted that this paper is confined to an analysis of the agricultural side 
of the enterprise. Determining the value of capital was problematic because the necessary 
details at a regional and an enterprise level were not always available. The value of capital 
was taken to be the costs of expenditure (seeds, fodder, mineral fertilizers, oil products, 
energy, spare parts, etc) and the cost of buildings and machinery calculated using a 
depreciation sum from annual reports measured in Kazakh Tenge (KZT, as for 2006 1US 
dollar = 130 KZT). Regional price indices for aggregated agricultural output were used. 
Description of data used for the analysis is represented in the Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of data (N=76) 
 Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std.  Deviation
Capital (1000 KZT)  138.00 139808.00 21646.6  34016.8
Labour (persons)  1.0 193.0 27.3  35.8
Arable land (ha)  43.0 37016.0 5157.4  7198.3
Crop production (metric 
centner) 
92.0 227231.0 22793.2 40441.2
Revenue (1000 KZT)  202.0 499908.0 50144.9  88970.5
Profit (1000 KZT)  -42450.0 349082.0 25254.3  56995.5
Average wage per person 
per year (1000 KZT) 
24.0 641.0 123.8 92.2
Distance (km)  7.0 295.0 151.9  75.9
 
According to an approach proposed by Lerman and Subbotin (2004), one can cluster 
factors influencing access to formal credit by agricultural enterprises in Kazakhstan into 
three groups. The first two groups describe internal characteristics of an agricultural 
enterprise as a producing entity: such factors as sources of cover both the principal and the 
interest rate; other factors characterise the extent of reliability and sustainability of an 
enterprise, in other words, an ability to cover any debts with collateral. A third group 
includes external factors which could influence commercial bank decision on credit 
rationing.  
 
Thus, these groups include the following variables: 
1. The first group includes such a factor as profit margin. These variables express an 
ability of an enterprise to have a level of income that could guarantee banks will be paid 
both the principal and the interest rate of credit.  
 
2. The second group includes factors such as the cost of equipment, size of arable land and 
size of circulating capital. These variables show whether the agricultural enterprise could 
be sustainable even in non-favourable conditions, in other words, whether the borrower 
could meet all the obligations to credit institutions in the case of default. One can suggest 
  
3. The third group includes two external factors: having access to a subsidized credit line 
and the distance to a city. The first variable could be considered as an additional factor of 
the sustainability of the enterprise, if one would not take into consideration corruption 
existing in a process of subsidized credit distribution. Thus, this variable could give 
information whether the borrower has some close links with local authorities and in some 
cases it could make it easier to obtain bank credit. The second variable of this group is the 
distance to the nearest city. It would be logical to suggest that if an enterprise is situated at 
a short distance from the city the opportunity to get credit is higher, because the bank 
would spend less money for the monitoring and appraisal.  
 
Unfortunately, it was impossible to obtain information on those enterprises that applied for 
credit but were rejected by the credit institution or, on the contrary, did not apply at all. 
Therefore, we cannot make any conclusions on their real willingness to borrow money 
from the formal credit institutions.  
 
The relation between one or more continuous determining variables and a single attribute 
could be described by applying binary discrete probability models (CRAMER 2003), in this 
study a binary logit regression is used to predict access to the formal credit market by 
agricultural enterprises and to describe the factors influencing this access. Logit regression 
allows for estimating a probability that an event occurs or not, by predicting a binary 
dependent outcome from a set of independent variables (VASISCHT 2009). The dependent 
variable is a dichotomous one and binary varying between 1 and 0, where 1 stands for 
credit access and 0 for lack of credit access. 
 
For k explanatory variables the general model is: 
 
ln(p/(1-p)) = Σ  + 1x1 + 2x2 + … + kxk,                    (1) 
 
where p is the probability of an agricultural enterprise obtaining a credit; k represents the 
estimated parameters and x k stands for the explanatory variables. As in ordinarily linear 
regression the x’s may be either interval-level variables or dummy variables. In the 
equation for the binary logit model there is no random disturbance term (ALLISON 1999). 
Explanatory variables include factors which could give information on what type of credit 
rationing is the most significant: price or non-price rationing.  
 
An ordinary linear regression model is used to show quantitative relations between a 
dependent variable - an amount of formal credit borrowed by an agricultural enterprise, 
and independent variables.  The general model for k explanatory variables is: 
 
y = 1x1 + 2x2 + … + kxk,                       (2) 
 
 where y is an amount of formal credit granted to the agricultural enterprise, k represents 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables and xk stands for the explanatory variables. 
The model includes the data for 2006 and contains 76 observations. 
 
3.1 Credit from commercial banks 
 
As a first step of this study a general analysis of the sample was undertaken. In table 4 the 
results of the t-test for mean values of factors characterising two groups of agricultural 
enterprises (with and without bank credit) are represented. According to the results, the 
differences between the compared groups regarding the size of arable land and the cost of 
equipment are significant. It means that those enterprises that have a larger land plot and 
more expensive (consequently more modern) equipment have more opportunities for 
obtaining bank credit.  Also, access to subsidized credit very strongly distinguishes the 
groups of enterprises. The level of revenue has less significance, but still can influence the 
possibility to be found in the group with bank credit rather in the group without bank 
credit. Profit, revenue, and distance are not significant. It probably means that the most 
important factor in the decision-making concerning granting credit to an agricultural 
enterprise is collateral. Other factors could be taken into account, but are less important 
for commercial banks. Such a variable as profit leads to conclusions of unwillingness of 
agricultural enterprises to apply for commercial bank credit and of an ability to cover 
independently the needs in financial investment from their own resources. Even though 
this analysis gives some information on existing general tendencies, it is not sufficient to 
describe how each factor influences access to the bank credit (LERMAN and SUBBOTIN 
2004). 
 
Table 4: Comparison of two groups of enterprises, with and without bank credit 













Average profit (1000 
KZT)  4215.3 8623.5 3203.5 0.97  0.35
Average size of arable 
land (ha)  5157.4 9892.5 3993.0 2.13  0.05*
Average cost of 
equipment (1000 KZT)  5712.9 14758.1 3488.7 2.24  0.04*
Subsidized credit  17.1 13.2 3.9 4.78  0.00***
Distance (km)  151.9 143.2 154.1 -0.45  0.65
Note: *** = significant at a level of 0.1%;  
  * = significance at a level of 5% 
 
The binary logit model used for the study of influence of factors on the bank credit 
obtaining is: 
 
ln(p/(1-p))= Σ+1 EQUIPMENT +2LAND+3DISTANCE+4SUBCRED+ 
 5P R O F I T M A R G                   ( 3 )  
        
The logit model has been analyzed using SPSS. Table 5 shows a description of variables 
used in the model. The independent variables are classified by the belonging to a certain 
group of factors.  
 
Table 5: Description of variables used in the binary logit model of access to bank 
credit 
Group   Variables    Hypothesis
Dependent CREDITBANK  credit from the commercial bank (1, if enterprises 
has a credit, 0, if not) 
 
2  EQUIPMENT  equipment, the value of depreciation sum (mln. 
KZT) 
+ 
2  LAND  arable land (thousand ha)  + 
3  DISTANCE  distance (km)  - 
3  SUBCRED(1)  subsidized credit, dummy (1, if an enterprise has 
a subsidized credit, and 0, if not) 
- 
1  PROFITMARG  profit margin   + 
 
The likelihood ratio chi-square of 39.4 tells us that the model as a whole fits significantly 
better than the empty model. Based on the Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test 
one can see the p-value is equal 0.6 and indicates that the logistic model is a good fit. That 
is, if the Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit test statistic is 0.05 or less, we reject the 
null hypothesis; if it is greater, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, implying that the 
model's estimates fit the data at an acceptable level (Garson 2009). Also one cannot 
observe homoscedasticity and the estimation of dependent variables is 88.0% correct. 
 
Table 6 shows the estimated parameters, standard errors, the Wald Chi-Square statistic, 
associated p-values and odds ratio (Exp(B)). If the Wald statistic is significant (i.e., less 
than 0.1) then the parameter is significant in the model. The explanatory variables 
EQUIPMENT, LAND, DISTANCE and SUBCRED in the model are significant at the 
level of at least 10% while the variable PROFITMARG is not.  
 
According to the results of the logit model one can say that for a unit increase in the 
explanatory variables, the odds of having access to formal credit (versus not having 
access) increased by a factor of (Exp(B)). Odds ratios less than 1.0 correspond to 
decreases and odds ratios more than 1.0 correspond to increases in odds. Odds ratios close 
to 1.0 indicate that unit changes in that independent variable do not affect the dependent 
variable level (GARSON 2009).  
 
The table 6 shows that machinery and buildings (EQUIPMENT) have an increased effect 
on access to credits; this variable is significant at the level of 1%. It could be explained by 
the fact that even though most of Kazakhstani agricultural enterprises possess obsolete and 
 worn-out machinery and buildings, exclusively machinery and buildings could be 
considered by commercial banks as suitable collateral.  
 
It is not very surprising to have such a variable as agricultural land with a significance of 
5%, but a negative sign by a coefficient is surprising. It means the more land operated by 
the enterprise the less probability it has to having bank credit. However, taking in to 
consideration the fact that all large-scale enterprises in the Pavlodar region are situated in 
the remote area from the city, one can suggests that for commercial banks the land located 
too far away is not acceptable as collateral. That is, commercial banks prefer to accept as 
collateral exclusively land plots within an urban area or very close to it to be able to sell 
those land plots without additional problems in the case of a borrower’s default. Also, 
taking into consideration an underdeveloped agricultural land market in Kazakhstan and a 
very low level of private ownership of land by agricultural producers, the reluctance of 
formal credit institutions to take agricultural land as collateral is not so surprising.   
 
The distance from the nearest city has appeared as a significant at the level of less than 
10%; and this variable has a negative sign as was expected. It proves the statement of an 
inverse relation between a probability to have credit from the bank and distance from the 
city. A short distance from the city means a higher opportunity to have bank credit.  
 
Access to the subsidized credits has the highest significance of 0.1% and a negative sign, 
which means that if agricultural enterprises could use state subsidised credits, they would 
be not in big need of applying for the bank credit with the significantly higher interest rate 
and more strict requirements. 
 
One could expect that such a variable as profit margin should appear as a significant one, 
however, it seems that agricultural enterprises prefer to finance purchasing of inputs and 
making investments from own recourses rather then via third parties (BUCHENRIEDER G. 
2002).  
 
Table 6: Logit estimates of the probability to have access to bank credit, 2006 
 
  B  S.E.  Wald  df  Sig.  Exp(B) 
EQUIPMENT  .19 .08 5.64 1 .017
***  1.21
LAND  -.27 .15 3.57 1 .059
**  .75
DISTANCE  -.012 .01 2.46 1 .12
*  .98
SUBCRED(1)  -5.68 1.69 11.20 1 .001
***  .003
PROFITMARG  -.13 .15 .71 1 .40  .88
Constant  4.85 2.31 4.44 1 .035  128.78
Note: 
*** = significance at level of 1%; 
** = significance at a level of 5% 
 
* = significance at a level of 10% 
 
 According to annual reports as much as 19.7% of reported agricultural enterprises had 
obtained bank credit. Taking into account that commercial banks prefer to finance 
exclusively large-scale grain producing agricultural enterprises, this number shows strict 
credit rationing by commercial banks and a rather high unwillingness of producers to 
apply for bank credit. 
 
Thus, one can recognise that non-price rationing is more important in the process of bank 
crediting for agricultural enterprises than price-rationing. Agricultural enterprises willing 
to pay the market interest rate for bank credit are rationed by their ability to submit proper 
collateral. In the conditions of Kazakhstan, when the largest part of agricultural land is 
rented, but not in private ownership, commercial banks could use as collateral only land 
use rights, but not land itself. All the bankers say that they do not know how they could 
use such collateral, if there is not a developed land market in Kazakhstan and clear legal 
regulations regarding land use rights.  
 
3.2 Credit from rural credit partnerships 
 
A general analysis of the sample as was presented in the previews case with commercial 
bank credit was undertaken for RCP credit. In the table 7 results of the t-test for mean 
values of the factors characterising two groups of agricultural enterprises (with and 
without RCP’s credit) are represented. Difference between two groups with respect to size 
of arable land, cost of equipment, profit, revenue, distance, fuel and seed are not observed. 
The groups differ only regarding subsidized credits. Having in mind that RCP credit could 
also be considered as subsidised credits distributed by means of partly state agencies, one 
can conclude those enterprises which have access to subsidized credit (say through 
personal relations or even by means of bribes), should have also access to RCP’s credit 
using the same channels.  
 
 Table 7: Comparison of two groups of enterprises, with and without RCP credit 












Average revenue (1000 
KZT) 
50144.9 51249.4 49776.8 0.06 
 
0.95 
Average profit (1000 
KZT) 
4215.3 5814.2 3672.8 0.51 
 
0.62 
Average size of arable 
land (ha) 
5157.4 6798.2 4610.4 0.91 
 
0.37 
Average cost of 
equipment (1000 KZT) 
5712.9 6173.3 5559.5 0.19 
 
0.85 
Average cost of fuel 
(1000 KZT) 
5738.0 6224.8 5575.8 0.32 
 
0.75 
Average cost of seed 
(1000 KZT) 
4455.3 3980.0 4613.8 -0.50 0.62 
Distance (km)  151.9 145.7 154.0 -0.43 0.66
Note: 
* = significance at a level of 5% 
 
The binary logit model used for the study of influence of a number of factors on a 
probability to have credits from the RCP is: 
 
ln(p/(1-p))= = Σ+1 EQUIPMENT +2 REVENUE +3LAND+4 DISTANCE 
+5SEED+6FUEL+7 PROFIT                      (4) 
 
The table 8 shows a description of variables used in the binary logit model. The 
independent variables are classified by the belonging to a certain group of factors 
described in a section 3.1.  
 
Table 8: Description of variables used in the logit model of access to RCP credit 
Group   Variables    Hypothesis
Dependent ACC  credit from the RCP (1, if enterprises have a credit, 
0, if not) 
 
2  EQUIPMENT equipment, the value of depreciation sum reported 
(mln. KZT) 
+ 
1  REVENUE  revenue (mln. KZT)  + 
2  LAND  arable land (ha)  + 
3  DISTANCE  distance (km)  - 
2  SEED  cost of seed (mln. KZT)  + 
2  FUEL  cost of fuel (mln. KZT)  + 
1  PROFIT  profit (mln. KZT)  + 
  
The likelihood ratio chi-square of 73.6 tells us that the model as a whole fits significantly 
better than the empty model. Based on the Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test 
one can see the p-value is equal 0.9 and indicates that the logistic model is a good fit. One 
cannot observe homoscedasticity and that the estimation of dependent variables is 80% 
correct  
 
Table 9 shows the most significant variables in the model are LAND and FUEL (at 5%). 
Indeed, decisions regarding granting credit are made by a committee of the Agricultural 
Credit Corporation (ACC). The RCP itself bears only group responsibility for the 
borrowed money. Thus, for the ACC the most important factor is the size of land plots 
because, being a state owned company, the ACC has no problems of dealing with 
agricultural land in a case a borrower default of payment. The second variable, FUEL, is 
related to a main aim of RCP credit: financing a sowing-harvest campaign. In other words, 
agricultural enterprises (members of RCP) mostly take out short-term credit to cover their 
needs in a circulating capital (mostly for purchasing fuel and seeds). The variable SEED is 
significant on the level of 6%, but has a negative sign by the coefficient. This could be 
explained by the influence of special state programs that are aimed to provide grain 
producers, in particular larger firms, with seeds during the sowing period. In other words, 
if a borrower has access to the state program, the probability that it has credit from an 
RCP goes down.  Variables REVENUE and EQUIPMENT are significant at the level of 
9% and both have a negative sign. These results are very surprising because according to 
information of the regional office of ACC machinery and buildings possessed by 
agricultural enterprises are important basis for granting credit. However, taking into 
consideration that RCP credits are generally much smaller than commercial bank credits, 
the enterprises that have a higher cost of equipment can afford to apply for bank credit. 
The variable DIST is not significant and has a negative sign as it was expected. This 
insignificance could be explained by the fact that RCPs’ head quarters are located in 
almost each rural district of the Pavlodar region. Thus, managers of RCPs are able to carry 
out monitoring and appraisal at a very low cost. However, the negative sign shows that the 
most remote enterprises have less valuable land plots from the point of view serving as 
collateral. The variable PROFIT is not significant probably because enterprises are 
unwilling to borrow from third parties if they have some of their own resources for 
investment.  
 
 Table 9: Logit estimates of the probability to have access to RCP credit, 2006 
  B  S.E.  Wald  df  Sig.  Exp(B) 
REVENUE  -0.02 0.01 2.88 1 0.09*  0.98
PROFIT  0.05 0.05 0.97 1 0.32  1.05
LAND  0.24 0.12 4.17 1 0.04**  1.27
EQUIPMENT  -0.14 0.08 2.92 1 0.09*  0.87
SEED  -0.35 0.19 3.47 1 0.06**  0.71
FUEL  0.34 0.17 4.12 1 0.04**  1.41
DISTANCE  -0.001 0.00 0.06 1 0.80  0.99
Constant  -1.21 0.72 2.75 1 0.09  0.29
Notes: 
**= significance at a level of 5%, 




The major results of this study could be summarized as follows. First of all, access to 
subsidized credit has the highest significance among other factors and has a negative sign. 
The role of this factor in determining access to bank credit and investment activity is as 
follows: if an agricultural enterprise has an opportunity to be granted with a subsidized 
credit (mostly through corruption), it is not in need of applying for commercial bank credit 
with a significantly higher interest rate. Major determinants of credit rationing are the size 
of arable land and a cost of equipment expressing an ability to submit them as collateral. 
Indeed, commercial banks as well as RCPs in Kazakhstan are reluctant to have any 
dealings with agricultural enterprises having no sufficient collateral to submit. Taking into 
account that the overwhelming majority of agricultural producers have very worn-out and 
obsolete machinery and buildings, they are very strictly rationed by formal credit 
institutions. Additionally, underdeveloped land market and unclear regulations concerning 
implementation of the land use rights in Kazakhstan make commercial banks to accept as 
collateral the land preferably situated in urban areas or very close to them, to be able to 
sell it without problems in the case of borrower’s default. As for RCPs, those enterprises 
which have large enough land plots have a high probability to be granted with credit. 
Additionally, those enterprises, whose production capacities are higher, that is, they need 
more fuel and seeds could be considered as the most reliable borrowers.  
 
Second, the analysis shows that variables characterizing price rationing are not very 
significant. Such a variable as profit is non-significant and probably expresses 
unwillingness of agricultural enterprises to apply to the third part if they have own 
recourses for financing their investment needs.   
 
The results of this study are consistent with the following policy implications. Although 
agricultural enterprises make their credit decisions conditional on the availability of 
subsidized credit and own recourses, funds are very restricted and cannot cover all 
  
investment needs, in particular as for long-term investments. According to Petrick: “This 
might be taken as evidence for a band-wagon effect, i.e. small loan amounts are taken on 
favourable terms to finance consumption activities, whereas there is no actual investment 
project available.” (PETRICK 2003). 
 
The results provide evidence that having formal credit is positively related to enterprise’s 
size, it reflects existing in Kazakhstan agricultural policy aimed on the enlargement of 
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